An analysis of some correlates of steady potentials in mammalian cerebral cortex

An analysis of some aspects of steady potential (SP) phenomena, especially in relation to some earlier experiments on SP correlates of hyperventilation and of epileptiform potentials during spreading depression is presented. The findings by others of SP shift with asphyxia, anoxia, cerebral ischemia and excess CO2 do not appear to explain the positive cortical SP shift during brief hyperventilation. While the polarity (and amplitude) and the incidence of epileptiform (and other) potentials show some correlations with intrinsic SP level and polarity across cell layers, such as the cerebral cortex, these correlations are far from consistent in degree or direction in all different conditions or neural tissues. On the other hand, the correlations of these functions with changes in SP that are induced by polarizing currents applied across such cell layers are highly consistent. Reasons are offered for considering this latter relationship to be a more significant index of the role of SP in these functions. In discussing the possible mechanisms that may produce the observed synchronization or coupling of epileptiform potentials at different points on the cortex, it is suggested that the local process which permits or facilitates the development of such potentials should be considered as one that is potentially distinct from more purely synchronizing mechanisms.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/32296/1/0000363.pd

Consciousness: the last 50 years(and the next)

The mind and brain sciences began with consciousness as a central concern. But for much of the 20th century, ideological and methodological concerns relegated its empirical study to the margins. Since the 1990s, studying consciousness has regained a legitimacy and momentum befitting its status as the primary feature of our mental lives. Nowadays, consciousness science encompasses a rich interdisciplinary mixture drawing together philosophical, theoretical, computational, experimental, and clinical perspectives, with neuroscience its central discipline. Researchers have learned a great deal about the neural mechanisms underlying global states of consciousness, distinctions between conscious and unconscious perception, and self-consciousness. Further progress will depend on specifying closer explanatory mappings between (first-person subjective) phenomenological descriptions and (third-person objective) descriptions of (embodied and embedded) neuronal mechanisms. Such progress will help reframe our understanding of our place in nature and accelerate clinical approaches to a wide range of psychiatric and neurological disorders

Illusory perceptions of space and time preserve cross-saccadic perceptual continuity

When voluntary saccadic eye movements are made to a silently ticking clock, observers sometimes think that the second hand takes longer than normal to move to its next position. For a short period, the clock appears to have stopped (chronostasis). Here we show that the illusion occurs because the brain extends the percept of the saccadic target backwards in time to just before the onset of the saccade. This occurs every time we move the eyes but it is only perceived when an external time reference alerts us to the phenomenon. The illusion does not seem to depend on the shift of spatial attention that accompanies the saccade. However, if the target is moved unpredictably during the saccade, breaking perception of the target's spatial continuity, then the illusion disappears. We suggest that temporal extension of the target's percept is one of the mechanisms that 'fill in' the perceptual 'gap' during saccadic suppression. The effect is critically linked to perceptual mechanisms that identify a target's spatial stability

Recurrent Activity in Higher Order, Modality Non-Specific Brain Regions: A Granger Causality Analysis of Autobiographic Memory Retrieval

It has been proposed that the workings of the brain are mainly intrinsically generated recurrent neuronal activity, with sensory inputs as modifiers of such activity in both sensory and higher order modality non-specific regions. This is supported by the demonstration of recurrent neuronal activity in the visual system as a response to visual stimulation. In contrast recurrent activity has never been demonstrated before in higher order modality non-specific regions. Using magneto-encephalography and Granger causality analysis, we tested in a paralimbic network the hypothesis that stimulation may enhance causal recurrent interaction between higher-order, modality non-specific regions. The network includes anterior cingulate/medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate/medial parietal cortices together with pulvinar thalami, a network known to be effective in autobiographic memory retrieval and self-awareness. Autobiographic memory retrieval of previous personal judgments of visually presented words was used as stimuli. It is demonstrated that the prestimulus condition is characterized by causal, recurrent oscillations which are maximal in the lower gamma range. When retrieving previous judgments of visually presented adjectives, this activity is dramatically increased during the stimulus task as ascertained by Granger causality analysis. Our results confirm the hypothesis that stimulation may enhance causal interaction between higher order, modality non-specific brain regions, exemplified in a network of autobiographical memory retrieval

Freedom in Nature

The paper starts with the proposal that the cause of the apparent insolubility of the free-will problem are several popular but strongly metaphysical notions and hypotheses. To reduce the metaphysics, some ideas are borrowed from physics. A concept of event causality is discussed. The importance of Hume's Principle of Causality is stressed and his Principle of Causation is weakened. The key concept of the paper, the so-called relative freedom, is also suggested by physics. It is a kind of freedom that can be observed everywhere in nature. Turning to biology, incomplete knowledge is defined for all organisms. They cope with the problem by Popper's trial and error processes. One source of their success is the relative freedom of choice from the basic option ranges: mutations, motions and neural connections. Finally, the conjecture is adopted that communicability can be used as a criterion of consciousness and free will is defined as a conscious version of relative freedom. The resulting notion is logically self-consistent and it describes an observable phenomenon that agrees with our experience.Comment: Changes: Improved formulation, three references added; 22 pages, no figure. Comments are welcom

Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple

The notion that free will is an illusion has achieved such wide acceptance among philosophers and neuroscientists that it seems to be acquiring the status of dogma. Nonetheless, research in this area continues, and this review offers a new analysis of the design limitations and data interpretations of free-will experiments. This review presents 12 categories of questionable conclusions that some scholars use to promote the idea that free will is an illusion. The next generation of less ambiguous experiments is proposed

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, we find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the presence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly non-naturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will